A long-term perspective on the evolution of the war in Ukraine. How can Kiev avoid a trajectory in favor of Russia

The nearly $61 billion US military aid package is a lifeline for Ukraine, but it is not a long-term solution. Ukraine needs a more comprehensive strategy that takes into account its problems as a whole if it is to ensure that Russia does not ultimately win, a Foreign Affairs analysis says.

The influx of American weapons and ammunition should greatly increase the cost of an expected Russian offensive this summer. At the same time, it should provide the Ukrainian forces with enough equipment for somewhat more systematic military planning for the summer and autumn.

However, an eventual end to the war on terms favorable to Ukraine requires more than equipment – it requires a strategy that prevents Russian victory at some point. In recent months, fickleness and delays in support from his partners have made this scenario plausible.

A counter-strategy that puts Ukraine in a position to set its own parameters for peace cannot be achieved easily, nor is it achievable overnight. At the same time, Ukraine does not have months to lose to find a way. And if the US and its NATO allies have to make clear long-term commitments to Ukraine, forcing Russia to negotiate will be particularly difficult.

“But the alternatives are much worse. In the absence of such a general strategy, it is possible that the duration of the conflict will extend, but not its trajectory”. it is stated in the analysis signed by Jack Watling, analyst at the Royal United Services Institute (London).

Since last fall, Ukraine’s battlefield situation has worsened, partly due to ammunition shortages, while Russia has gained territory and amassed some 470,000 troops, expected by the end of this year to try the complete conquest of the Donbas region.

Talk of a new Russian offensive tends to picture tank assaults on Ukrainian defensive lines, breaking through them, and then attempts to exploit the gaps to advance deep into Ukrainian territory and isolate combat units. At the moment, however, Russia does not have the ability to carry out such operations, nor does it intend to. After more than two years of war, its large-scale attack capabilities are limited and consist mainly of platoon- and company-level assaults, allowing for slow advances with heavy casualties.

But they still enjoy a substantial 10 to 1 advantage in artillery. With American help, Ukraine can reduce it to maybe 3 to 1 – at least in certain regions.

But Russia has several means at its disposal to engage Ukrainian forces in costly battles for Ukraine. Among them, dropping aerial guided bombs of up to 1.5 tonnes on Ukrainian cities – possibly causing the population to flee the attacks.

As a result, Ukrainian forces were often forced to expend substantial resources defending individual positions only to thereby protect populated areas within range of these modified Soviet bombs. One example is the high-rise city of Ceasiv Iar, strategically located in the eastern Donetsk region, which, if it fell, would give the Russians a good position from which to bomb other Donbas cities as well as key supply routes. So the Ukrainian forces are desperately trying to hold on in defense, even if from a tactical point of view the situation becomes unfavorable. A negative factor is also the tightened air defense capability that now allows Russian warplanes to get closer to the front lines, and to target with greater precision.

The solution to this challenge would typically be what military strategists call an “active defense,” using small-scale counterattacks to interrupt the attacker’s efforts to consolidate his advances.

It’s just that Ukraine has too few reserves and has lost many of the tactical vehicles needed to exploit Russian vulnerabilities immediately after capturing positions. The only option in this case is to seek to maximize Russian losses in the fight for each position and thus slow the pace at which it advances.

Under these conditions, the American aid that came so late can only help to address the gaps in Ukrainian capabilities.

Meanwhile, Ukraine will lose ground. The question is how much he will lose this summer and what cost he will be able to impose on Russia in return for potential gains.

Fresh bands

Apart from the immediate supply of ammunition, the new US aid is important primarily because it provides clarity about the resources Ukraine can rely on in the next six months so that it can make a comprehensive strategic plan.

The main priority would be the generation of new forces – mobilizing, training and equipping them. That was impossible while she waited for American aid to be approved, and she was forced to prioritize equipment for the troops already at the front.

“Ukrainian commanders must form new brigades, rather than restore the strength of already existing formations. Currently, the army does not have enough brigades to be able to rotate them entirely from the front. Instead, individual brigades rotated depleted battalions off the line of contact for short breaks—a strategy that allows for some rest but does not allow for collective brigade training, as long as brigade personnel and support equipment remain at the front. It is therefore crucial for Ukraine to build and train additional brigades now so that it can mount an active defense in the fall. Over time, these new units will greatly increase his counterattack capability.

Therefore, the Ukrainian army must pursue mobilization in three stages. First, they must immediately muster battlefield replacements for existing forces. But then they have to regenerate reserves to allow existing units to rotate and after that build new units capable of offensive action. The first one is the easiest to solve. The equipment is the limiting factor for the second one. For the third, the most limiting factor is officer training. This can be addressed, but must be done urgently if Ukraine is to generate the necessary forces by the fall.

A long-term perspective

Russia will likely be especially dangerous in the final months of 2024. By then, after months of withstanding Russian offensive operations, Ukrainian forces will be stretched to the limit and their air defenses will be exhausted. Russia will probably have enough troops to rotate its units and allow for successive offensives in the fall.

But Russian capabilities are not unlimited. Moscow has made some industrial and military choices that will likely limit its offensive potential throughout 2025. First, it has decided not to expand production of artillery barrels, meaning fewer new guns will be available next year. Based on the current loss rate, Russia’s stockpile of armored vehicles is also likely to be depleted by the second half of 2025. This means that Russian forces will depend entirely on newly produced equipment rather than refurbished equipment from existing stockpiles, which will severely limit their ability to restore weapon systems lost in combat.

At the same time, starting from the end of 2024, European arms production will start to increase steadily, as the investments made last year and in the first months of this year will start to bear fruit. Therefore, by 2025, supply problems should be less acute for Ukraine and more acute for Russia – if Ukraine can hold out until then.

With this long-term perspective in mind, the challenge facing Ukraine and its allies becomes clear. The top priorities must be not only to ensure that Russia’s summer offensive culminates at a high cost to Moscow, but also that newly formed Ukrainian troops are there to counter further offensives in the autumn – and ideally to to establish a stable front line by the beginning of 2025. Only from such a position can Ukraine regain the initiative. Achieving this goal will depend significantly on how quickly Ukraine can mobilize and equip its forces. The only good he is sorely lacking is time.” says the analysis signed by Jack Watling, from the Royal United Services Institute (London).