The US military began sending desperately needed aid to Ukraine on the front lines as soon as President Joe Biden signed the $60 billion aid bill into law, but what does that support really mean for Ukraine and for President Russian Vladimir Putin, shows Financial Times in an analysis that highlights the pressures Kiev will face, but also Russia’s dashed hopes.
Ukrainian artillerymenPhoto: Diego Herrera Carcedo / AFP / Profimedia
First, the publication notes, the goal is to give Russia as little time as possible to make the most of its current superiority.
Soldier problems, which remain chronic, would be alleviated, while new recruits do not face the prospect of being sent into combat with insufficient ammunition, and Ukraine’s existing stockpiles can be released immediately: they no longer need to be dosed because of the concern that they will never be replaced.
American aid will give impetus to European countries to continue to provide assistance in turn. British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak announced a new £500m package during a visit to Warsaw, while there are more projects to provide Ukraine with additional ammunition, Patriot air defense systems and F-16 aircraft Ukraine.
In the first instance, the new aid will most likely slow down the Russian offensive, without reversing the situation on the front, and Ukraine will still take many blows from Russia.
It must be borne in mind that new units are to be trained, which is taking time, and many command problems still remain after last year’s disappointing counter-offensive, particularly on how to coordinate large-scale operations. This, while the soldiers who are from the beginning of the war at the front are exhausted from fighting and building fortifications.
Ukraine may face pressure from the US to make gains on the front
Kiev may face pressure to make serious military gains before November’s US elections to help justify the assistance. The source points out that aside from his legal troubles, one explanation for Trump’s relative silence while Congress approved the $60 billion aid package is that he couldn’t accuse Biden of wasting money on Ukraine if aid had not been sent to be “wasted”.
Ukraine also needs more resources because it cannot be sure of the value of future military aid, especially if Donald Trump wins the presidency.
For now, Ukraine’s best way to continue its fight against Russia is to continue with the kind of attacks it has regularly mounted recently, namely long-range drone strikes against refineries and other targets with a certain strategic value in Russia.
Ukraine will not be able to use the long-range ATACMS missiles or additional Storm Shadow cruise missiles promised by Sunak to attack targets in Russia. However, there are many military-related targets available in occupied Ukrainian territory, including Crimea.
While there are no easy ways to bring Russia to its knees, Russian vulnerabilities can be exposed. It will become harder for Vladimir Putin to end the war more quickly, which was certainly his hope before the congressional vote. He might have hoped that the loss of a major city like Kharkiv would push Ukraine into a downward spiral.
Now we return to the prospect of endless war. True, Putin prepared for this. But the scale of Russia’s recent losses for limited gains and the embarrassment of being unable to stop Ukrainian attacks on Russian territory means it currently lacks a clear path to victory.
Even if Trump wins the presidential election in November, that does not guarantee Putin a satisfactory result. After publicly boasting for the past six months that Russia had taken the initiative in the war, Putin must now consider the possibility that it may once again fall to Ukraine.
Although some warnings went so far as to suggest that Ukraine might lose the war, by the end of the year Kiev held on, and now has reason to be more optimistic than before when Ukrainian officials warned of very difficult weeks ahead.
Moreover, in another Financial Times analysis, experts and officials believe that, for now, Russia does not have a major advantage in any chapter and that the offensive that could begin in May or June will not provide Moscow with serious progress in the field of the fight.
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